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Abstract
We investigate the problem of reliable communication in the presence of active adversaries that
can tamper with the transmitted data. We consider a legitimate transmitter-receiver pair connected over
multiple communication paths (routes). We propose two new models of adversary, a “memoryless” and
a “foreseer” adversary. For both models, the adversaries are placing themselves arbitrarily on the routes,
keeping their placement fixed throughout the transmission block. This placement may or may not be
known to the transmitter. The adversaries can choose their best modification strategy to increase the error
at the legitimate receiver, subject to a maximum distortion constraint. We investigate the communication
rates that can be achieved in the presence of the two types of adversaries and the channel (benign)
stochastic behavior. For memoryless adversaries, the capacity is derived. Our method is to use the typical
set of the anticipated received signal for all possible adversarial strategies (including their best one) in
a compound channel that also captures adversarial placement. For the foreseer adversaries, which have
enhanced observation capabilities compared to the memoryless ones, we propose a new coding scheme
to guarantee resilience, i.e., recovery of the codeword independently of the adversarial (best) choice.
We derive an achievable rate and we propose an upper bound on the capacity. We evaluate our general
results for specific cases (e.g., binary symbol replacement or erasing attacks), to gain insights.
Index Terms
Physical-layer active adversaries; Modification attacks; Replacement attacks; Erasing attacks; Multi-
route transmission.
2I. INTRODUCTION
Operation in adverse networks requires secure and reliable communication: data modifications should
not be merely detected but data should be delivered (decoded correctly) at their destination. Cryptographic
primitives can ensure detection but not correction and thus data delivery. Consider a general network
connecting a Transmitter (Tx) - Receiver (Rx) pair over multiple disjoint communication paths (e.g.,
multiple frequency bands or antennas in wireless networks, or multiple routes in multi-hop networks);
adversaries can be present in a number of those paths. The challenge is how to leverage the available
alternative paths in order to achieve reliable communication in the presence of the adversary. What is
the best one can do against a powerful adversary? More generally, what is the best communication rate
one can achieve in the face of malicious faults (adversarial modifications) and benign faults (due to the
communication channel stochastic behavior)?
Facets of this problem were addressed in the literature. One approach leverages cryptographic prim-
itives to detect modifications and attempt retransmissions over alternative communication paths (while
introducing redundancy to tolerate faults) [1]. This, however, does not address the fundamental limits
of the system performance. Without cryptographic assumptions, the minimum needed connectivity is
derived for resilient communication for a Tx-Rx pair over n disjoint paths, termed wires, and disrupted
by active adversaries that compromise a subset of these wires (the scenario is termed the Dolev model)
[2]. The analysis in [2] does not consider communication rates and thus does not even attempt to achieve
the best performance; it does not model channel noise and does not consider adversarial limitations or
fine-grained actions.
In contrast, confidentiality received significant attention, notably after Wyner’s seminal paper [3],
with the majority of works concerned with passive eavesdroppers [4, Chapter 22]. Less attention, in an
information-theoretic sense, was paid to active adversaries that modify the channel input of the legitimate
transmitter. An early characteristic model is the Arbitrarily Varying Channel (AVC) [5], which assumes
worst-case interference: the adversary controls the channel state to maximize the error probability at
the receiver. Depending on what the adversary knows and the common randomness of the legitimate
nodes, the capacity can differ considerably [6], [7]. However, it is not easy to translate erasing and
replacement attacks to the AVC worst-case interference notations. In particular, AVC cannot capture data
modification attacks or network structure, e.g., as the Dolev model does [2]. Given that confidentiality
(passive adversaries) is broadly researched in the information-theoretic sense (also in [2]), the challenge
is how to achieve (secure and) reliable communication in the presence of active adversaries, in addition
3to channel noise, and derive fundamental limits of the capacity?
In this paper, we address this challenge. We propose a novel information-theoretic setup that captures
network structure, fine-grained and strong, yet realistic active adversarial behavior, along with channel
stochastic behavior. We consider a Tx-Rx pair communicating across a number of disjoint paths (routes).
The adversaries compromise a fixed number of these routes, thus they get access to the respective
(noiseless) transmitted signals. The adversaries can choose their best strategy (knowing the transmitted
signal) to modify and increase the error at the Rx. However, their mapping is subject to a maximum
distortion constraint, i.e., a distortion limit. This limit, given a distortion measure (depending on the
specific attack), determines the distance between the transmitted codeword and its modified version;
e.g., for an erasing attack on binary transmissions, the percentage of bits the adversary can erase. The
adversaries’ placement (on the routes) is arbitrary but fixed throughout one transmission block; moreover,
it may be known to the Tx. The adversaries’ observations (of the transmitted signal) can be either
instantaneous or cover the entire codeword. We propose accordingly two adversary types: memoryless
and foreseer. Our goal is to find the reliable communication rate a Tx-Rx can achieve in the presence of
either of these two types of adversary.
Our average distortion limit and the consideration of channel stochastic behavior (noise) on top of
adversarial faults lead to a generalized model compared to the Dolev one for active adversaries. The
channel noise we introduce in our model, which allows us to take into account benign faults and
noisy observations, is not taken into account in the Dolev model. The distortion limit allows practical
assumptions, e.g., adversaries with noisy observations, with tactics to remain undetected, limited resources
or time or attempts to mount an attack, or even cryptographic integrity protection for parts of the messages
(e.g., immutable fields). By setting the noise to zero and the distortion limit to its maximum, we reduce
our model to the Dovel model.
We derive the capacity for the memoryless adversaries. For the achievability part, we use a compound
channel to model the adversaries’ placement. For each compromised route, we consider the typical set
of the anticipated received signals in all possible adversarial scenarios (including the one for the best
adversarial strategy), subject to the distortion limit. Then, for the foreseer adversaries, we propose a coding
scheme using two techniques: (i) the Hamming approach [8], to cope with worst-case errors inflicted by
adversaries with access to the entire codeword, and (ii) a random coding argument, to recover from the
channel stochastic noise. For the former, we use the Varshamov construction [9], to guarantee the required
minimum distance needed to mitigate adversary-inflicted errors. Moreover, we obtain an upper bound to
the capacity, taking an approach similar to that for the Hamming bound (i.e., limiting the volume of the
4Hamming balls). Finally, we gain insights through three special cases: replacement and erasing attacks
on binary transmission and Gaussian jamming. We determine the proper distortion measures and channel
distributions to model attacks that correspond to realistic situations, e.g., bit or packet replacement and
dropping (selective forwarding), and evaluate our derived rates for those. For these cases, we consider
explicitly the best adversarial strategy: we show the adversaries can achieve the lower bounds on the
capacity we derived without specific assumptions on the adversary strategy. Our results for these special
cases reveal that (i) knowing the adversaries’ placement at Tx is not useful in terms of the achievable
reliable rate, (ii) memory helps the adversaries significantly, and (iii) differentiates the foreseer effect
from channel noise; while the memoryless effect is equivalent to channel noise.
II. CHANNEL MODEL
Notation: Upper-case letters (e.g., X) denote Random Variables (RVs) and lower-case letters (e.g.,
x) their realizations. Xji indicates a sequence of RVs (Xi,Xi+1, ...,Xj); we use Xj instead of Xj1 for
brevity. The probability mass function (p.m.f) of a RV X with alphabet set X is denoted by pX(x);
occasionally subscript X is omitted. The set of all possible distributions on X is denoted by P(X ).
π(x, y|xn, yn) ∈ P(X × Y) shows the joint type (i.e., empirical p.m.f) of two sequences of length n,
which can be extended to several n-length sequences. Pn(X ) ⊂ P(X ) consists all possible types of
sequences xn ∈ X n. For q ∈ Pn(X ), the type class is defined as T n(q) = {xn, pX(x) = q}. Anǫ (X,Y )
is the set of ǫ-strongly, jointly typical sequences of length n. N (0, σ2) denotes a zero-mean Gaussian
distribution with variance σ2. B(α) is a Bernoulli distribution with parameter α ∈ [0, 1]. Fq is a finite field
with q elements. We define [x]+ = max{x, 0}. Unless specified, logarithms are in base 2. Throughout
the paper, i and j indices are used for time and route number, respectively. Hq : [0, 1] → R is the Hilbert
q-ary entropy function Hq(x) = x logq(q − 1)− x logq x− (1 − x) logq(1− x). Bold letters are used to
show the column vectors of length nr, e.g., xn =
[ x1,1 ... x1,n
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
xnr,1 ... xnr,n
]
and xn(j) shows its jth row.
Channel model: Consider a single unicast scenario: Tx sends a message M to Rx, with nr available
disjoint routes. na out of the nr routes are attacked by the adversaries, with their placement being
arbitrary but fixed throughout one transmission block. The placement can be chosen by the adversaries
to maximize the error at Rx; but, it may be known to the Tx. One can implicitly assume there are na
adversaries: more than one adversary in a route can be modeled as a stronger adversary (i.e., with a
higher distortion limit). We model this scenario with a (compound) state-dependent multi-route Point-to-
Point channel with Modifying Adversaries (PP-MA) illustrated in Fig. 1: its transition probability is not
entirely specified unless the Channel State Information (CSI) (i.e., adversaries’ placement information)
5݌ ࢟|࢞௔  ࢄ ࡿ ࢄ௔ ܯ ࢅ ܯ෡  Tx Rx ܐ ࢔ Adversaries 
modification 
Adversaries placement 
Fig. 1. Multi-route Point-to-Point channel with Modifying Adversaries (PP-MA).
is known [10]. Consider finite alphabets X ,Xa,Y . The channel inputs at the Tx and the adversaries are
defined by X ∈ X nr and Xa ∈ X nra respectively. Y ∈ Ynr is the output of the channel at Rx. The
j-th element of state vector S ∈ {0, 1}nr , i.e., S(j), determines the presence of an adversary in j-th
route. The received signal at Rx only depends on the adversary input, if present. Each adversary channel
input must be relatively close to the Tx input in that route (subject to a distortion limit), according to
some distortion metric. Hence, we define the D class of adversaries for j ∈ {1, . . . , nr} by the set of all
probability distributions:
Paj (D) = {pj(x
n
a |x
n) : Epnj [d(X
n
a ,X
n)] ≤ D} (1)
where d is a distortion measure defined by the mapping d : X ×Xa 7→ [0,∞) and the average distortion
for two sequences is d(xna , xn) = 1n
n∑
i=1
d(xa,i, xi). We assume the Xa 7→ Y channel is memoryless, thus
the transition probability can be expressed by the conditional p.m.f on Y × Xa as:
p(yn,xna |x
n, sn)=p(yn|xna)p(x
n
a |x
n, sn) (2)
=
nr∏
j=1
pj(y
n(j)|xna (j))pj(x
n
a(j)|x
n(j), sn(j))
=
nr∏
j=1
pj(x
n
a(j)|x
n(j), sn(j))
n∏
i=1
pj(yi(j)|xa,i(j))
The state vector, assumed fixed in one transmission block, models the channel statistics transmission
block: si(j) = s(j) for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with at most na ≤ nr adversaries, i.e., wH(s) ≤ na. Hence, for
j ∈ {1, . . . , nr}:
pj Xa|X,S(x
n
a(j)|x
n(j), sn(j))=pj Xa,s|X(x
n
a(j)|x
n(j)) = qj,s(x
n
a(j)|x
n(j))
where
qj,s(x
n
a |x
n) ∈ Paj (Dj,s = s ·Dj) (3)
6which is due to the Dj distortion limit at each adversary. In n channel uses, Tx sends M to Rx using
the following code:
Definition 1: A (2nR, n, P (n)e ) code for the multi-route PP-MA consists of:
1) A message set, M = [1 : 2nR], with message M uniformly distributed over M.
2) An encoding function, fn, at Tx, which maps M to a codeword xn ∈ X nr×n.
3) A set of adversaries’ mapping, hn, with hn(j) : X n × {0, 1} 7→ X na for j ∈ {1, . . . , nr} satisfying
(3).
4) A decoding function at Rx, g : Ynr×n 7→ M.
5) The probability of error for this code, defined as:
P (n)e =
1
2nR
∑
m∈M
Pr(g(yn) 6= m|m sent). (4)
In case the CSI is available at the Tx, we have: fn :M×{0, 1}nr 7→ X nr×n. All codewords are revealed
to all nodes (including adversaries). However, the adversaries’ mapping is not known to the legitimate
Tx and Rx.
Definition 2: A rate R is achievable if there exists a sequence of (2nR, n, P (n)e ) codes such that for
∀s ∈ {0, 1}nr : wH(s) ≤ na and ∀hn we have P (n)e → 0 as n →∞. The capacity, C, is the supremum
of all achievable rates R.
Memoryless active adversary: The mapping at each adversary satisfies:
pj(x
n
a(j)|x
n(j), sn(j)) =
n∏
i=1
pj(xa,i(j)|xi(j), si(j)) (5)
i.e., the adversary uses the same probability distribution to modify the transmitted symbols in each channel
use. For each route j, the distribution in (5) is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) and fixed
over time; but, clearly, the distributions can differ across routes.
Foreseer active adversary: It observes the transmitted codeword over the entire block (i.e., xn(j))
upon which it bases its strategy. That is, while satisfying (3), the adversary can choose the position and
value of the symbols in the codeword to be modified. In this case, we concentrate on two types of attacks:
Replacement attacks: X = Xa = Y with hamming distortion measure:
d(x, xˆ) =
{
1, if x 6= xˆ
0, if x = xˆ
(6)
Erasing (dropping) attacks (also known as selective forwarding): Xa,Y = {X , e} where for all x, x′ ∈
X , x 6= x′, d(x, x) = 0, d(x, x′) = ∞ and d(e, x) = d(x, e) = 1. With this definition, we limit the
7adversaries only to erase the data and they cannot replace data as long as their distortion limits are finite,
i.e., Dj <∞ for j ∈ {1, . . . , nr}.
These two types cover all possible modification attacks. It is reasonable to assume that anything outside
the alphabet is rejected by Rx; thus, this can be modeled as an erased symbol. Therefore, the adversary
does not gain anything by modifying to a non-existent symbol.
III. MAIN RESULTS
For our multi-route PP-MA, for both memoryless and foreseer adversaries, we consider either no CSI
or CSI at Tx. The adversaries are assumed to have perfect CSI.
A. Memoryless active adversaries
We state the capacity for the channel in (5), first assuming no CSI available at the Tx and Rx.
Theorem 1: The capacity of the multi-route PP-MA satisfying (5), with no CSI available at either the
Tx or the Rx is:
CnCi.i.d = sup
p(x)
min
s∈{0,1}nr
wH(s)≤na
inf
nr∏
j=1
pj(xa(j)|x(j),s(j))
∀j∈{1,...,nr}:Epj [d(Xa(j),X(j))]≤Dj,s=s·Dj
nr∑
j=1
I(X(j);Ys(j)) (7)
where ∀s ∈ {0, 1}nr , we have Ys ∈ Ynr and
p(yn|xn,xna , s
n) =
nr∏
j=1
pj Y |Xa,X,S(y
n(j)|xn(j),xna (j), s
n(j)) =
nr∏
j=1
pj Ys|Xa,X(y
n(j)|xn(j),xna (j)).
Hence, the mutual information term is evaluated with respect to the joint p.m.f (2).
Proof outline: For the achievablility part, we use a random coding argument in a compound channel
(to model the adversaries’ placement). To take into account all possible i.i.d adversaries’ strategies, we
consider all possible joint types of (xn(j),yn(j)) for the j-th route, subject to the distortion limit on
xna(j). The converse follows from Fano’s inequality, by noting that for every adversaries’ placement and
mapping (s and hn) we must have P (n)e n→∞−→ 0. Detailed proof in Appendix.
Remark 1: On the j-th route, the conditional distribution of the adversary’s channel input, i.e., pj(xa(j)
|x(j), s(j)), can model all possible memoryless active attacks (e.g., replacement or dropping). To specify
a certain attack, it is enough to properly define the input alphabets, Xa,X , and the distortion measure
d(., .). Thus, the inf is calculated over a feasible set of X × Xa distributions (pj), where the feasibility
constraint is determined by Epj [d(Xa(j),X(j))] ≤ Dj,s = s ·Dj .
Next, we obtain the capacity when CSI is available at Tx (proof in Appendix).
8Theorem 2: The capacity of multi-route PP-MA satisfying (5), with CSI available at Tx is:
CTCi.i.d = min
s∈{0,1}nr
wH(s)≤na
sup
p(x)
inf
nr∏
j=1
pj(xa(j)|x(j),s(j))
∀j∈{1,...,nr}:Epj [d(Xa(j),X(j))]≤Dj,s=s·Dj
nr∑
j=1
I(X(j);Ys(j)) (8)
where the notation Ys is defined in Theorem 1 and the mutual information term is evaluated with respect
to the joint p.m.f (2).
B. Foreseer active adversaries
Now, we derive lower and upper bounds on the capacity for all possible foreseer adversaries strategies.
The bounds are based on the possible minimum distances the legitimate user codewords can tolerate
under each attack.
Theorem 3: A lower bound to the capacity of the multi-route PP-MA with foreseer adversaries (no
CSI available at Tx or Rx) is:
RnCl = supmin inf
hn
nr∑
j=1
[H(V) −H(Xa(j)|Y(j)) −
H|X |(dj)
log|X | 2
]+
where the supremum and the minimum are taken over p(x)p(v|x);∀j ∈ {1, . . . , nr} : Epj [d(V(j),X(j))] ≤
dj and s ∈ {0, 1}nr : wH(s) ≤ na, respectively; dj = f(Dj,s = s(j) ·Dj) is determined based on the
attack type and the distortion measure (i.e., dj = s(j) · 2Dj for replacement attacks and dj = s(j) ·Dj
for erasing attacks); the second entropy, H(Xa(j)|Y(j)), is evaluated with respect to the memoryless
channel: pj(yn(j)|xna(j)) =
n∏
i=1
pj(yi(j)|xa,i(j)).
Proof outline: We apply a random coding technique on top of a random linear code (Varshamov
construction [9]), by introducing proper auxiliary codewords. Random coding is used to combat the
stochastic behavior of the Xa 7→ Y channel. Varshamov construction guarantees recovery from the worst-
case errors, by making the minimum distance of the code greater than the number of errors. First, we
generate auxiliary codewords, u; then, we apply a random linear coding nr times to these codewords, to
generate the transmitted codewords, xn. To decode from the j-th route: if Rx can decode the adversary’s
channel input xna(j), the transmitted codeword is the only xn(j) in a Hamming ball with radius dj . To
apply this scheme, we choose vn(j) as the possible xna(j) and try to decode it after receiving yn(j), by
decreasing its rate to satisfy the stochastic limitation imposed by the Xa 7→ Y channel. Proof details in
the Appendix.
9Theorem 4: A lower bound on the capacity of the multi-route PP-MA with foreseer adversaries (CSI
available at Tx) is:
RTCl = min sup inf
hn
nr∑
j=1
[H(V)−H(Xa(j)|Y(j)) −
H|X |(dj)
log|X | 2
]+
where the minimum and the supremum are taken over s ∈ {0, 1}nr : wH(s) ≤ na and p(x)p(v|x);∀j ∈
{1, . . . , nr} : Epj [d(V(j),X(j))] ≤ dj , respectively; dj and Hq(x) are defined in Theorem 3; the second
entropy, H(Xa(j)|Y(j)), is evaluated with respect to pj(yn(j)|xna (j)) =
n∏
i=1
pj(yi(j)|xa,i(j)).
Remark 2: In both RnCl and RTCl , the first term is independent of s and the second term is independent
of p(x). Therefore, we have RnCl = RTCl . That is, CSI does not help the achieving strategy for these
rates.
Theorem 5: The following are upper bounds to the capacity of the multi-route PP-MA with foreseer
adversaries:
RnCu =sup
p(x)
min inf
hn
nr∑
j=1
[I(Xa(j);Y(j)) −
H|X |(
dj
2 )
log|X | 2
]+ (9)
RTCu =min sup
p(x)
inf
hn
nr∑
j=1
[I(Xa(j);Y(j)) −
H|X |(
dj
2 )
log|X | 2
]+ (10)
where the minimum is taken over s ∈ {0, 1}nr : wH(s) ≤ na and dj and Hq(x) are defined in Theorem 3.
Proof outline: We follow an approach similar to the one used to derive the Hamming bound, that
is, we limit the volume of the coding balls. Proof in the Appendix.
IV. EXAMPLES
Replacement attacks to binary transmission: The channel inputs and output have binary alphabets
(i.e., X ,Xa,Y = {0, 1}) and d is the Hamming distortion measure (defined in Section II). The stochastic
channel from the adversary to the Rx is assumed to be a Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC). Thus, the
channel output at Rx at time i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is:
Yi(j) =Xa,i(j) ⊕ Zi(j) (11)
where Zi(j) ∼ B(Nj) for j ∈ {1, . . . , nr}. First, consider memoryless active adversaries. We obtain the
results of Theorems 1 and 2 as:
Corollary 1: The capacity of the multi-route PP-MA with binary alphabets satisfying (5), (11), for
both no CSI and CSI at Tx, is:
CnCi.i.d = C
TC
i.i.d = nr − max
s∈{0,1}nr
wH(s)≤na
nr∑
j=1
max
N ′j≤s(j)·D˜j
H(Nj ∗N
′
j)
10
where D˜j = min{Dj , 1−Dj} and α∗β = α(1−β)+β(1−α). If we assume identical route conditions,
Dj = D ≤
1
2 and Nj = N for j ∈ {1, . . . , nr}, the capacity is: nr − (nr − na)H(N) − naH(N ∗D).
Proof: Let Pj = Pr(X(j) = 1) and without loss of generality assume Pj ≤ 12 . To find the
inf
nr∑
j=1
I(X(j);Ys(j)) in (7), we first find a lower bound to it and we then show it is achievable by the
adversaries.
I(X(j);Ys(j))=H(X(j)) −H(X(j)|Ys(j))
≥H(Pj)−H(X(j) ⊕Xa(j) ⊕ Z(j))
(a)
≥ H(Pj)−H(Nj ∗N
′
j)
in (a) we define N ′j ≤ s(j)·Dj and use Pr(X(j) 6= Xa(j)) ≤ s(j)·Dj . This lower bound is achievable by
the j-th adversary if it chooses a joint distribution given by two backward BSCs, Y → Xa and Xa → X ,
with cross-over probabilities Nj and N ′j , respectively. This results in Pr(Xa(j) = 1) =
Pj−N ′j
1−2N ′j
. Hence,
we need Pj ≥ N ′j to hold. Therefore, (7) for this channel is:
CnCi.i.d = sup
0≤Dj≤Pj≤
1
2
min
s∈{0,1}nr
wH(s)≤na
nr∑
j=1
[H(Pj)− max
N ′j≤s(j)·Dj
H(Nj ∗N
′
j)]
The rest of the proof is straightforward.
Now, consider foreseer active adversaries. We obtain the results of Theorems 3 and 4 as:
Corollary 2: The lower bound to the capacity of the multi-route PP-MA with foreseer adversaries,
binary alphabets satisfying (11), for both no CSI and CSI at Tx is:
RnCl = R
TC
l = nr −
nr∑
j=1
H(Nj)− max
s∈{0,1}nr
wH(s)≤na
nr∑
j=1
H(s(j) · 2Dj) (12)
For identical route conditions, Dj = D ≤ 12 and Nj = N for j ∈ {1, . . . , nr}, the rate is nr(1−H(N))−
naH(2D).
Proof: Let Vi(j) = Xi(j) and Pj = Pr(X(j) = 1). Recall that for all hn (Definition 1, satisfying
(3)), we have Pr(X(j) 6= Xa(j)) ≤ s(j) · Dj . After some calculations, we can compute H(V(j)) =
H(Pj) and
H(Xa(j)|Y(j))≤H(Xa(j) ⊕Y(j)) = H(Zi(j)) = H(Nj)
and obtain (3) as:
RnCl ≥ sup
0≤Pj≤
1
2
min
s∈{0,1}nr
wH(s)≤na
nr∑
j=1
[H(Pj)−H(Nj)−H(s(j) · 2Dj)] (13)
which will be maximized for Pj = 12 independently of s(j), for j ∈ {1, . . . , nr}. This results in (12). It
is easy to see that computing RTCl in Theorem 4 results in the same rate.
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We adapt Theorem 5 for binary alphabets and the BSC of (12):
Corollary 3: The upper bound to the capacity of the multi-route PP-MA with foreseer adversaries,
binary alphabets satisfying (11), for both no CSI and CSI at Tx, is:
RnCu = R
TC
u = nr −
nr∑
j=1
H(Nj)− max
s∈{0,1}nr
wH(s)≤na
nr∑
j=1
H(s(j) ·Dj) (14)
For identical route conditions, Dj = D and Nj = N for j ∈ {1, . . . , nr}, the rate is nr(1 −H(N)) −
naH(D).
Proof: We combine the methods of Corollaries 1 and 2. We can show that the sum of the first and
the second terms in the right side of (13) makes an upper bound on the first term of (9) and (10). To do
this, it is enough to choose the proper joint distribution for the adversaries’ input that achieves this bound.
This distribution consists of two backward BSCs, Y → Xa and Xa → X , with cross-over probabilities
Nj and Dj , respectively. The rest of the proof is similar to that of Corollary 2.
Erasing attacks on binary transmission: To reduce the erasing attacks to binary alphabets, we set:
X = {0, 1}, Xa,Y = {0, 1, e}, d(0, 0) = d(1, 1) = 0, d(0, 1) = d(1, 0) = ∞, and d(0, e) = d(1, e) =
1. Across the Xa 7→ Y channel, additional erasing is introduced for the received signal at Rx (not
distinguishable from the adversarial erasing at Rx). Thus, the channel output at Rx at time i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
is:
Yi(j) =
{BEC(Xa,i(j), Nj), if Xa,i(j) 6= e
Xa,i(j), if Xa,i(j) = e
(15)
where BEC(x, β) shows a Binary Erasure Channel (BEC) with input x and probability of erasure β.
Here, we state our results for both memoryless and foreseer adversaries. Proofs in Appendix.
Corollary 4: The capacity of the multi-route PP-MA with X = {0, 1} and Xa,Y = {0, 1, e}, satisfying
(5) and (15), for both no CSI and CSI at Tx, is:
CnCi.i.d = C
TC
i.i.d = min
s∈{0,1}nr
wH(s)≤na
nr∑
j=1
(1− s(j) ·Dj)(1−Nj).
For identical route conditions, Dj = D and Nj = N for j ∈ {1, . . . , nr}, the capacity is (1−N)(nr −
naD).
Corollary 5: The lower bound to the capacity of the multi-route PP-MA with foreseer adversaries,
X = {0, 1} and Xa,Y = {0, 1, e}, satisfying (15), for both no CSI and CSI at Tx, is:
RnCl = R
TC
l = min
s∈{0,1}nr
wH(s)≤na
nr∑
j=1
1−Nj(1−N
′
j)− N¯jH(
N ′j
N¯j
)−H(s(j) ·Dj)
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where N¯j = Nj(1 − s(j) · Dj) + s(j) · Dj . For identical route conditions, Dj = D and Nj = N for
j ∈ {1, . . . , nr}, the rate is nr(1−N)− na[(N(1−D) +D)H( DN(1−D)+D ) +H(D)−D].
Corollary 6: The upper bound to the capacity of the multi-route PP-MA with foreseer adversaries,
X = {0, 1} and Xa,Y = {0, 1, e}, satisfying (15), for both no CSI and CSI at Tx, is:
RnCu = R
TC
u = min
s∈{0,1}nr
wH(s)≤na
nr∑
j=1
[H((1−N ′j)(1−Nj)) + (1−N
′
j)(1−Nj −H(Nj))−H(s(j) ·
Dj
2
)]
where N ′j = s(j) ·Dj . For identical route conditions, Dj = D and Nj = N for j ∈ {1, . . . , nr}, the rate
is na(H((1 −N)(1−D)) + (1 −D)(1 −N −H(N))−H(D2 )) + (nr − na)(1−N).
Gaussian replacement attacks: We assume Gaussian distributions for the channel inputs and output.
The distortion measure now is the squared error distortion:
d(x, xˆ) = (x− xˆ)2
and the channel model can be shown as:
Yi(j) =Xa,i(j) + Zi(j) (16)
where Zi(j) ∼ N (0, Nj) for j ∈ {1, . . . , nr} are independent and i.i.d Gaussian noise components.
We assume the average power constraint on input signal X(j) as 1
n
n∑
t=1
|xt(j)|
2 ≤ Pj . Hence, X(j) ∼
N (0, Pj) for j ∈ {1, . . . , nr}. Here, we only consider the memoryless adversaries and obtain the results
of Theorems 1 and 2 (proof in Appendix).
Corollary 7: The capacity of the multi-route PP-MA with Gaussian distributions for channel inputs
and output, satisfying (5) and (16), for both no CSI and CSI at Tx, is:
CnCi.i.d = C
TC
i.i.d = max
s∈{0,1}nr
wH(s)≤na
nr∑
j=1
θ(
Pj − s(j) ·Dj +Nj
s(j) ·Dj +Nj
)
where θ(x) .= 12 log(x). For identical route conditions, Dj = D and Nj = N with equal power constraints
Pj = P for j ∈ {1, . . . , nr}, the capacity is: nrθ(1 + PN )− naθ(1 +
D(P+2N)
N(P−D+N)).
Comparison: Along with identical route conditions, to simplify, let nr = na = 1. Table I shows the
results for the replacement and erasing attacks on binary transmission. Obviously, for zero distortion
for the adversary (D = 0), we have BSC and BEC with parameter N . The rate reduction caused by a
foreseer adversary is considerable. Consider only the adversary’s effect by setting N = 0: the foreseer is
twice more powerful than the memoryless one (in terms of the lower bound) for the replacement attack.
For the erasing attack, the foreseer reduces (compared to the memoryless) the rate from a BEC rate
(i.e., 1 −D) to a BSC rate (i.e., 1 −H(D)). For Gaussian replacement attacks (under these simplified
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TABLE I
OUR RESULTS FOR THE REPLACEMENT AND ERASING ATTACKS ON BINARY TRANSMISSION WITH nr = na = 1.
Replacement Erasing
Memoryless Capacity 1−H(N ∗D) (1−N)(1−D)
Foreseer lower 1−H(N)−H(2D) 1−N(1−D)− (N(1−D) +D)H( D
N(1−D)+D
)−H(D)
upper 1−H(N)−H(D) H((1−N)(1−D)) + (1−D)(1−N −H(N))−H(D
2
)
assumptions), the capacity is 12 log(1 + P−2DD+N ); while, for Gaussian independent jamming with power
D, we achieve 12 log(1 +
P
D+N ). Thus, knowing the transmitted codeword (even in a memoryless case)
worsens the situation compared to an independent jammer.
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Proof of Theorem 1:
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Achievability: We use random encoding and joint typicality decoding. Considering the problem setup
in Section II, we denote the set of possible joint types of triple of sequences (xn, xna , yn) ∈ X n×X na ×Yn
as:
Pnj,s(X × Xa × Y) = {πj(x, xa, y|x
n, xna , y
n) : Epnj,s [d(X
n
a ,X
n)] ≤ Dj,s = s ·Dj} (17)
and the possible pairs of (xn, yn) ∈ X n ×Yn for some xna ∈ X na :
Pnj,s(X × Y) = {πj(x, y|x
n, yn) : ∃xna ∈ X
n
a such that (xn, xna , yn) ∈ Pnj,s(X × Xa × Y)} (18)
For q ∈ Pnj,s(X × Y), the type class is defined as T nj,s(q) = {(xn, yn), pXY (x, y) = q}. Note that, given
the adversaries are memoryless, we have:
p(yns |x
n)=
n∏
i=1
pYs|X(ys,i|xi) =
n∏
i=1
pY|X,S(ys,i|xi, s)
=
∑
xa
n∏
i=1
nr∏
j=1
qj,s(xa,i(j)|xi(j))pj(yi(j)|xa,i(j)) (19)
where qj,s is defined in (3).
Fix pX(x) and generate 2nR i.i.d sequences xn[m], each with probability
n∏
i=1
pX(xi), where m ∈ [1 :
2nR]. To transmit m, Tx sends xn[m]. Rx after receiving yn, looks for a unique index m˜ that satisfies:
(xn[m˜],yn) ∈ Anǫ (X,Ys).
Due to the symmetry of the random codebook generation, the probability of error is independent of
the specific messages. Hence, to analyze the probability of error, without loss of generality, we assume
that m = 1 is encoded and transmitted. The error events at Rx are:
E1={∀s ∈ {0, 1}
nr , wH(s) ≤ na : (x
n[1],yn) /∈ Anǫ (X,Ys)}
E2={∃s ∈ {0, 1}
nr , wH(s) ≤ na such that (xn[m],yn) ∈ Anǫ (X,Ys) for some m 6= 1}
Due to the Asymptotic Equipartition Property (AEP) [11], Pr (E1)→ 0 as n→∞. Now, to consider
the probability of E2, let ∀s ∈ {0, 1}nr :
E ′2,s={∃m 6= 1 such that (xn[m],yn) ∈ Anǫ (X,Ys)} (20)
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with probability:
Pr(E ′2,s)
(a)
≤
∑
m6=1
nr∏
j=1
∑
q∈Pnj,s(X×Y)
Pr((xn(j)[m],yn(j)) ∈ T nj,s(q))
≤
∑
m6=1
nr∏
j=1
|Pnj,s(X × Y)| sup
q∈Pnj,s(X×Y)
Pr((xn(j)[m],yn(j)) ∈ T nj,s(q))
(b)
≤
∑
m6=1
nr∏
j=1
|Pnj,s(X × Y)| sup
pj(xa(j)|x(j),s(j))
Epj [d(Xa(j),X(j))]≤Dj,s=s·Dj
2−n(I(X(j);Ys(j))−δ(ǫ))
(c)
≤
∑
m6=1
nr∏
j=1
((
|X |
n
))((
|Y|
n
))((
|Xa|
n
))
sup
pj(xa(j)|x(j),s(j))
Epj [d(Xa(j),X(j))]≤Dj,s=s·Dj
2−n(I(X(j);Ys(j))−δ(ǫ))
≤
∑
m6=1
nr∏
j=1
n|X |+|Y|+|Xa|
(|X | − 1)!(|Y| − 1)!(|Xa| − 1)!
sup
pj(xa(j)|x(j),s(j))
Epj [d(Xa(j),X(j))]≤Dj,s=s·Dj
2−n(I(X(j);Ys(j))−δ(ǫ))
(d)
≤n|X |+|Y|+|Xa|2nR2−n(Θs−δ(ǫ)) (21)
where (a) follows from (19) and xn(j)[m] shows the jth element of vector xn[m], (b) follows from joint
typicality lemma and the memoryless property of the channel X → Y according to (19), (c) follows
from [12, Lemma II.1], (17), (18), where ((k
n
))
=
(
n+k−1
k−1
)
is the multiset number, (d) follows from the
independence of disjoint paths, where we define
Θs = inf
nr∏
j=1
pj(xa(j)|x(j),s(j))
∀j∈{1,...,nr}:Epj [d(Xa(j),X(j))]≤Dj,s=s·Dj
nr∑
j=1
I(X(j);Ys(j))
Therefore:
Pr(E2)≤
(
nr
na
)
max
wH(s)≤na
Pr(E ′2,s)
≤
(
nr
na
)
max
wH(s)≤na
n|X |+|Y|+|Xa|2n(R−Θs+δ(ǫ))
=
(
nr
na
)
n|X |+|Y|+|Xa|2
n(R− min
wH (s)≤na
Θs+δ(ǫ))
Hence, considering the finite alphabets, if R ≤ min
s∈{0,1}nr
wH(s)≤na
Θs− δ(ǫ), Pr(E2) goes to zero as n→∞. This
completes the achievablility proof.
Converse: The converse easily follows from Fano’s inequality, by noting that for every s ∈ {0, 1}nr :
wH(s) ≤ na and every hn (Definition 1), we must have H(M |Yns ) ≤ nǫn for some ǫn n→∞−→ 0.
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Proof of Theorem 2: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1. Hence, we only describe the
differences in the achievablility part. Here, Tx generates |S| =
(
nr
na
)
codebooks, Cs, similar to the one
in Theorem 1 (with fixed pX(x) for each codebook). To transmit m, knowing the current state of the
channel, si = s for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Tx selects Cs and transmits xn[m] from that codebook. The rest of
the proof is similar to Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 3: We apply a random coding technique on top of a random linear code
(Varshamov construction [9]). To make this combination possible, we propose a new coding scheme
by using proper auxiliary codewords.
First, consider the replacement attacks(defined in Section III-B) and let dj = s · 2Dj , j ∈ [1 : nr].
Now, fix pX(x) and generate 2nR i.i.d sequences uk[m] each with probability
n∏
i=1
pX(ui), for some
k ≥ nR log|X | 2 where m ∈ [1 : 2nR]. Repeat the following codebook generation process nr times (for
j ∈ {1, . . . , nr}) to produce xn:
Choose a random |X |-ary matrix Gj ∈ Fk×n|X | whose elements are uniformly and independently chosen
from F|X |. Let V be the set of all n-length sequences in X n. Now, use the matrix Gj as a generator
matrix to generate 2nR sequences xn(j)[m] = uk(j)[m]Gj (Varshamov construction) with minimum
distance dj . Therefore, this code satisfies the Gilbert-Varshamov bound: for every |X | ≥ 2 and real
0 ≤ dj ≤ 1−
1
|X | , the volume of the Hamming ball centered at x
n(j)[m] (∀m ∈ [1 : 2nR], j ∈ [1 : nr])
is bounded as:
|X |nH|X|(dj)−o(n) ≤ V ol|X |(x
n(j)[m], n × dj) ≤ |X |
nH|X|(dj) (22)
Then, pick the sequences in V that belong to these hamming balls and call them codewords, vn(j)[m, l]:
vn(j)[m, l] ∈ B|X |(x
n(j)[m], n × dj), where l shows each codeword’s index in the ball, l ∈ [1 :
V ol|X |(x
n(j)[m], n × dj)]. Let Lj = 1n log|X| 2 maxm log|X | V ol|X |(x
n(j)[m], n × dj). This means that the
vn(j) is selected according to p(v|x) : Epj [d(V(j),X(j))] ≤ dj for j ∈ {1, . . . , nr}.
To transmit m, Tx sends xn[m]. Rx after receiving yn, looks for a unique index m˜ and some l˜ such
that:
(vn[m˜, l˜],yn) ∈ Anǫ (Xa,Y).
Due to the symmetry of the random codebook generation, the probability of error is independent of the
specific messages. Hence, to analyze the probability of error, without loss of generality, we assume that
m = 1 is encoded and transmitted. Note that although the foreseer adversaries’ channel inputs are chosen
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with memory, the channel from the adversaries to the Rx is i.i.d, i.e.,
p(yn|xna)=
nr∏
j=1
n∏
i=1
pj(yi(j)|xa,i(j)) (23)
Due to (3), we have xna(j) ∈ B|X |(xn(j)[1], n × dj) for j ∈ [1 : nr]. Thus, the error events at Rx are:
E1={∀s ∈ {0, 1}
nr , wH(s) ≤ na,∄l
′ : (vn[1, l′],yn) ∈ Anǫ (Xa,Y)}
E2={∃s ∈ {0, 1}
nr , wH(s) ≤ na, such that (vn[m, l′],yn) ∈ Anǫ (Xa,Y) for some m 6= 1 and some l′}
Based on the problem definition, we are sure that xna(j) ∈ B|X |(xn(j)[m], n × dj). Since vn(j)[m, l]
covers all the codewords in this ball, xna(j) = vn(j)[m, l′] for some l′. Therefore, thanks to the AEP
[11], Pr (E1)→ 0 as n→∞. Now, to consider the probability of E2, define:
E ′2,s={∃m 6= 1such that(vn[m, l′],yn) ∈ Anǫ (Xa,Y)for some l′}
for every s ∈ {0, 1}nr . Considering (23), the joint AEP [11] implies:
Pr(E ′2,s) ≤ 2
n(R+
nr∑
j=1
Lj)
2−n(H(Y)+H(V)−H(Xa ,Y)−ǫ)
Therefore, if R+
nr∑
j=1
Lj ≤ H(V)−H(Xa|Y)− δ(ǫ), Pr(E
′
2,s) goes to zero as n→∞. Using (22) and
the disjoint path property, we have:
R ≤
nr∑
j=1
[H(V(j)) −H(Xa(j)|Y(j)) −
H|X |(dj)
log|X | 2
]− δ(ǫ) (24)
for all hn. Thus, Pr(E2) ≤
(
nr
na
)
maxwH(s)≤na Pr(E
′
2,s) goes to zero if (24) holds for all s ∈ {0, 1}nr :
wH(s) ≤ na which results in R ≤ min
s∈{0,1}nr
wH(s)≤na
inf
hn
nr∑
j=1
[H(V(j)) −H(Xa(j)|Y(j)) −
H|X|(dj)
log|X| 2
] − δ(ǫ). The
proof for erasing attacks is similar by defining dj = s ·Dj and noting that a code with minimum distance
dj can recover from dj erasures. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4: The proof is straightforward considering the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3.
Proof of Theorem 5:
No CSI: We use the asymptotic Hamming bound (i.e., sphere packing bound) to limit the rate of a
code that wishes to correct Dj errors. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3, first consider the replacement
attacks with dj = s · 2Dj , j ∈ [1 : nr]. As M → X(j) → Xa(j) → Y(j) forms a Markov chain for
j ∈ {1, . . . , nr}, using Fano’s inequality, for every hn, hn(j) : X n × {0, 1} 7→ X na satisfying (3), we
have:
H(Xna |Y
n) ≤ H(M |Yn) ≤ nǫn
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where ǫn → 0 as n→∞. Hence
H(Xna)≤I(X
n
a ;Y
n) + nǫn
(a)
≤n
nr∑
j=1
I(Xa(j);Y(j)) + nǫn (25)
for all hn, where (a) follows from (2).
To consider all possible hn, we must consider the type class T n(Pnj,s(X × Y)). Recall that one must
be able to correct any possible dj2 = s ·Dj errors made by the adversary on jth route. This means that
the minimum distance of the codewords must be greater than dj . Otherwise, the adversary intentionally
always chooses the closer codeword that cannot be distinguished at the Rx. Thus, the rate of the code
for every s ∈ {0, 1}nr : wH(s) ≤ na and every hn (Definition 1) must satisfy the Hamming bound (for
a minimum distance dj):
2nR
(a)
≤
|T ns (P
n(X × Y))|
nr∏
j=1
∑ dj
2
l=0
(
l
n
)
(|X | − 1)l
≤
|T ns (P
n(X × Y))|
nr∏
j=1
|X |nH|X|(
dj
2
)
(b)
≤
2nH(X
n
a )
nr∏
j=1
|X |nH|X|(
dj
2
)
(c)
≤
nr∏
j=1
2nI(Xa(j);Y(j))+nǫn
|X |nH|X|(
dj
2
)
for all hn, where (a) follows by defining T ns (Pn(X × Y)) = {(xn, yn) : (xn(j), yn(j)) ∈ T nj,s(Pnj,s(X ×
Y))}, (b) follows from [12, Lemma II.2], (c) follows from (25). For erasing attacks, it is enough to define
dj = s · Dj and note that a code with minimum distance dj can recover from dj erasures. Therefore,
(9) is proved. The proof for the case of CSI at Tx follows a similar lines by considering the proof of
Theorem 2. This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 4: Let Pj = Pr(X(j) = 1) and without loss of generality assume that Pj ≤ 12 .
Also, let Pr(Xa(j) = e) = N ′j ; considering the distortion measure defined above with finite distortion
limits (i.e., Djs) and adversaries’ model in Definition 1, we have N ′j = Pr(Xa(j) 6= X(j)) ≤ s(j) ·Dj .
Thus,
H(Ys(j))=H((1− Pj)(1 −N
′
j)(1−Nj), Pj(1−N
′
j)(1−Nj), 1− (1−N
′
j)(1−Nj))
=H((1−N ′j)(1−Nj)) + (1 −N
′
j)(1−Nj)H(Pj)
H(Ys(j)|X(j))=H((1−N
′
j)(1−Nj))
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Therefore, we have: I(X(j);Ys(j)) = (1−N ′j)(1 −Nj)H(Pj). Now, we can obtain (7), as:
CnCi.i.d = sup
0≤Dj≤Pj≤
1
2
min
s∈{0,1}nr
wH(s)≤na
nr∑
j=1
min
N ′j≤s(j)·Dj
(1−N ′j)(1 −Nj)H(Pj).
which will be maximized for Pj = 12 independent of s(j) for j ∈ {1, . . . , nr}. Hence, the rest of the
proof is straightforward.
Proof of Corollary 5: Let Vi(j) = Xi(j) for j ∈ {1, . . . , nr}, Pj = Pr(X(j) = 1) and N ′j .=
s(j) ·Dj . Recall that for all hn (Definition 1, satisfying (3)), we have Pr(X(j) 6= Xa(j)) = Pr(Xa(j) =
e) ≤ N ′j . After some calculations, one can compute:
H(V(j)) = H(Pj)
H(Xa(j)|Y(j)) ≤ N¯jH(
N ′j
N¯j
) +Nj(1−N
′
j)H(Pj)
where we defined N¯j = Nj(1−N ′j) +N ′j . The rest of the proof is straightforward.
Proof of Corollary 6: Similarly to the proof of Corollary 3, it is enough to choose the proper
joint distribution for the adversaries’ input. Hence, let Xa,i(j) = BEC(Xi(j),S(j) ·Dj). Computing the
mutual information term in (9) completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 7: The achievablility follows by the standard arguments that extend the achievable
rate to the Gaussian case with continuous alphabets [11]. As we assume Gaussian channel inputs, let
Xa(j) ∼ N (0, Pa,j) where E[d(Xna(j),Xn(j))] ≤ s(j) ·Dj . To find the inf
nr∑
j=1
I(X(j);Ys(j)) in (7),
first we find a lower bound and then we show it is achievable by the adversaries.
I(X(j);Ys(j))=H(Ys(j)) −H(Ys(j)|X(j)) (26)
≥H(Xa(j) + Z(j)) −H(Xa(j)−X(j) + Z(j))
=
1
2
log(2πe(Pa,j +Nj))−H(X(j)−Xa(j) − Z(j))
(a)
≥
1
2
log(2πe(Pa,j +Nj))−
1
2
log(2πe(s(j) ·Dj +Nj))
where in (a) we use E[d(Xna(j),Xn(j))] ≤ s(j) ·Dj . (26) should be minimized over all Pa,j satisfying
the distortion limit. Thus, Pa,j = Pj − s(j) ·Dj . This lower bound is achievable by adversaries if they
choose a joint distribution with a backward Gaussian test channel, Xi(j) = Xa,i(j) + Z′i(j), where
Z′i(j) ∼ N (0, s(j) ·Dj ) and Xa,i(j) ∼ N (0, Pj − s(j) ·Dj). The rest of the proof is straightforward.
